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Note 
 
Licensing Liability: Responding to Judicial 
Expansion of Antitrust Enforcement in North 
Carolina Dental 
Lesley E. Roe 
  INTRODUCTION   
On January 20, 2017, Dr. Chet Evans wrote an open letter 
to members of the podiatric profession and state policymakers, 
threatening to resign from his position as chair of the Florida 
Board of Podiatric Medicine unless the State agreed to indem-
nify him and others similarly situated against personal liability 
for the actions of the board.1 This letter followed a letter from 
members of the board addressed to Governor Rick Scott, written 
a month earlier.2 On February 3, 2017, Dr. Evans made good on 
his promise and submitted his resignation, as did fellow board 
member Dr. Scott Koppel.3  
These events occurred in the wake of North Carolina State 
Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, a 2015 Supreme Court deci-
sion greatly expanding the antitrust liability of state licensing 
boards.4 In a six to three decision, the Court held that state 
 
  J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to 
Professor Daniel Schwarcz for his expertise and thoughtful comments through-
out this process. I would also like to thank The Center of State Enforcement of 
Antitrust and Consumer Protection Laws for valuable insight in selecting this 
topic, especially Professor Prentiss Cox, Chairman Kevin O’Connor, and Exec-
utive Director Steve Houck. Thanks also to the editors and staff members of 
Minnesota Law Review for their work on this Note and all of Volume 103, with 
special thanks to Frances Fink, David Hahn, and Joshua Davis for editorial 
contributions. Copyright  2018 by Lesley E. Roe. 
 1. Chet Evans, Podiatric Medical Board Volunteers Nationwide NOT Im-
mune to Lawsuit: An Open Letter to the Podiatric Profession, PODIATRY MGMT. 
ONLINE (Jan. 20, 2017), http://podiatrym.com/search3.cfm?id=98854. 
 2. FLA. BD. OF PODIATRIC MED., MEETING MINUTES 7 (2017), http:// 
floridaspodiatricmedicine.gov/meetings/minutes/2017/02-february/020317 
-minutes.pdf (discussing the letter to Governor Scott). 
 3. Id. 
 4. 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
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boards may be subject to antitrust liability for actions that re-
strain competition, if a controlling number of board members are 
active market participants, and if the board is not adequately 
supervised by the state.5 Prior to North Carolina Dental, many 
boards assumed that, as agents of the state, licensing boards 
were immune to antitrust liability, regardless of the board’s com-
position.6  
North Carolina Dental’s effect on the Florida Board of Podi-
atric Medicine was hardly unique. The daily operations of thou-
sands of occupational regulatory boards across the country were 
thrown into a state of uncertain legal status when the Supreme 
Court’s decision was announced.7 On average, each state has 
about thirty-nine licensing boards.8 After North Carolina Den-
tal, each board became a substantial liability risk to the state, 
almost overnight.  
Many states scrambled to mitigate the legal exposure North 
Carolina Dental created.9 In Florida, a bill was introduced in 
 
 5. Id. at 1117. 
 6. See, e.g., Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. No. 15-402, at 2 (2015) (“Before North Car-
olina Dental was decided, most state licensing boards operated under the as-
sumption that they were protected from antitrust suits under the state action 
immunity doctrine.”). 
 7. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licens-
ing Boards Up Close, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (2017) (noting that there 
are 1790 occupational licensing boards across the country). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Some states responded to the decision by first seeking guidance through 
the state attorney general’s office. See, e.g., Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6; 
Idaho Exec. Order No. 16-01 (Jan. 13, 2016); Letter from Pam Bondi, Fla. State 
Att’y Gen., to Andy Gardiner, President of the Fla. State Senate (Dec. 9, 2015), 
https://media.nasba.org/files/2015/12/Florida-Attorney-General-Letter-to 
-Legislature.pdf. Others took executive action through the office of the governor. 
See Del. Exec. Order No. 60 (2016) (establishing a Professional Licensing Re-
view Committee by executive action in a direct response to North Carolina Den-
tal); Okla. Exec. Order No. 2015-33 (2015) (mandating that all non-rulemaking 
actions of state boards comprised of a majority of market participants are sub-
ject to review by the Oklahoma Office of the Attorney General); see also Ala. 
Exec. Order No. 7 (2011) (disbanding occupational boards through executive ac-
tion with a stated purpose of “creating a competitive business environment,” 
noting that the regulatory burden imposed by the board was no longer neces-
sary). While issued several years before North Carolina Dental, the Alabama 
Executive Order demonstrates an important role that governors’ offices may 
play by disassembling unnecessary boards without going through legislative re-
peal. Ala. Exec. Order No. 7. Still other states attempted legislative action in 
response to the increased litigation risk facing licensing boards. See, e.g., H.B. 
2501, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016) (establishing a system to review rules 
issued by health profession regulatory boards for potential anticompetitive ef-
fects); S. Con. Res. 65, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2016) (establishing a Task 
Force on Meaningful Oversight to evaluate whether Louisiana’s current 
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January of 2017 seeking to indemnify individual board members 
against antitrust liability.10 This action evidently came too late 
for Drs. Evans and Koppel. While their resignations are among 
the most drastic individual responses to North Carolina Dental, 
the threat facing the doctors was far from illusory. At the time 
the doctors resigned, at least three cases citing North Carolina 
Dental had been filed in Florida;11 additionally, the State Attor-
ney General’s Office had advised state boards that “there is no 
coverage of defense costs, damages or attorney fee awards in the 
event a Board Member is sued for [an] Antitrust Violation.”12 Be-
cause federal antitrust statutes provide for treble damages, the 
Florida Attorney General opined that damages following from 
antitrust liability may constitute punitive damages, placing 
them in a category not covered by Florida’s indemnification 
scheme.13 The absence of indemnification, the frequent market-
sensitive decisions that make up the board’s core functions, and 
automatic treble damages under the Sherman Act combined to 
create a high disincentive for the two doctors to continue their 
volunteer service on the Florida Board of Podiatric Medicine, 
 
healthcare licensing system complies with North Carolina Dental); S.B. 2, 90th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (providing for legislative review of agency 
action including board action); H.B. 1007, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 
2015) (amending occupational licensing board statutes in response to North 
Carolina Dental). 
 10. S.B. 582, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017). 
 11. Ramos v. Tomasino, No. 16-CV-80681, 2016 WL 8678546, at *1, *3 n.3 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2016), aff ’d in relevant part, 701 F. App’x 798 (11th Cir. 
2017) (dismissing antitrust claims of disbarred attorney against Florida State 
Bar and holding that the State Bar is an “arm[ ]  of the State” and therefore 
North Carolina Dental does not apply); Rosenberg v. Florida, No. 15-22113-CIV, 
2015 WL 13653967, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2015) (dismissing antitrust claims 
against Florida State Bar filed by attorney suspended from practice of law for 
one year and holding that North Carolina Dental does not apply “because The 
Florida Bar is an arm of the state (a sovereign entity)—not a non-sovereign ac-
tor that is authorized by the State to regulate its own profession”); Baker Cty. 
Med. Servs., Inc. v. State, 178 So. 3d 71, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing 
antitrust liability of state’s agency for Healthcare Administration when it ex-
ceeded its authority in extending a certificate of need to a corporation, even 
though antitrust was not among the claims brought by plaintiffs). 
 12. FLA. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., US SUPREME COURT RULING IN NORTH 
CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS V. FTC: OVERVIEW, IMPLICA-
TIONS, AND THE NEW REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 38 (2016), http://www 
.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/re/documents/FREAB%20Meeting%20Documents/ 
2016/0416GM/0416FREABAntiTrust.pdf. 
 13. Id. 
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notwithstanding the corrective legislation introduced in the 
State Senate.14  
Ultimately, the Florida bill died in committee after reaching 
the House.15 As a result, members of licensing boards across all 
occupations in Florida are exposed to the same personal liability 
risk that drove Dr. Evans out of a board position he held for 
seven years. The practical issues raised by North Carolina Den-
tal are particularly acute in Florida, where the existing indem-
nification scheme for lawsuits brought against public actors in 
their official capacity has an unclear application to antitrust lit-
igation.16 However, the increased liability of licensing boards af-
fects regulators of every profession across every state in the 
country.  
This Note will discuss several legislative and state execu-
tive-level responses to North Carolina Dental, and conclude by 
recommending a legislative partnership between states and the 
federal government, intended to address both the litigation risk 
facing licensing boards, as well as the legitimate economic con-
cerns informing the Court’s 2015 decision. Part I will lay the 
groundwork for this ultimate recommendation by discussing the 
role of occupational licensing in the United States, the legal en-
vironment of boards before and after North Carolina Dental, and 
state and federal legislative responses to the Court’s decision. 
Part II will argue that the liability risk states now bear under 
North Carolina Dental is so great that a legislative response is 
necessary, but that neither state nor federal responses to date 
are sufficient to address the legal predicament facing licensing 
boards. Part III will draw from existing legislative responses, as 
well as current scholarship on state board liability, to outline key 
elements of cooperative legislation capitalizing on the strengths 
of both the federal and state levels, while avoiding the pitfalls 
that make legislation at either level insufficient on its own.  
 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business 
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may 
sue . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost 
of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”). 
 15. Bill History, FLA. SENATE, https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2017/ 
00582/?Tab=BillHistory (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
 16. FLA. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., supra note 12 (“Risk Management ad-
vises that there is no coverage of defense costs, damages or attorney fee awards 
in the event a Board Member is sued for Antitrust Violation.”). 
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I.  NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL AND REACTIONARY 
RESCUE LEGISLATION   
This Part provides an overview of the major governmental 
systems and legal doctrines implicated by North Carolina Dental 
and the legislation that has followed the Court’s 2015 decision. 
Section A discusses state licensing boards as public-private ac-
tors, acting with delegated authority from the state, but com-
prised primarily of private actors. Section B describes the scope 
of occupational licensing boards and the role they play in regu-
lating service economies. Section B also identifies competing in-
terests shaping the debate over whether licensure helps or 
harms consumers. Section C provides a brief history of state ac-
tion immunity—a longstanding facet of the Supreme Court’s an-
titrust jurisprudence which holds that states are sovereign ac-
tors, not subject to federal antitrust laws. Section C describes the 
intersection of North Carolina Dental and state action immun-
ity, and outlines the dilemma now facing state licensing 
boards—charged with making market sensitive decisions to pro-
tect consumers, but bearing potential antitrust liability for their 
actions. Section D outlines federal and state legislative re-
sponses to North Carolina Dental, designed to help resolve this 
dilemma. Finally, Section E provides an overview of the Restor-
ing Board Immunity Act of 2017,17 which is a federal bill intro-
duced in response to North Carolina Dental. 
A. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING BOARDS: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP 
Occupational licensing has a long history in the United 
States, and has historically been a state, rather than federal, is-
sue.18 In 2015, there were 1790 state licensing boards in the 
United States, all of which were created by statute and charged 
with regulatory responsibilities.19 The California Board of Psy-
 
 17. H.R. 3446, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1649, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 18. See, e.g., Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 169–70 (1923) (upholding li-
censing requirement for practice of dentistry); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 
114, 123 (1889) (upholding a West Virginia statute prohibiting the unlicensed 
practice of medicine). 
 19. See Allensworth, supra note 7 (reporting 1790 state licensing boards 
created by statute in her fifty-state survey). 
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chology, for example, is authorized by California’s Psychology Li-
censing Law.20 Similarly, the Minnesota Board of Medical Ex-
aminers is established by the Minnesota Medical Practice Act.21 
This statutory authorization and delegation of legislative power 
mirrors the creation of traditional state agencies.  
Licensing boards resemble traditional state agencies in sev-
eral respects. For example, the North Carolina State Board of 
Dental Examiners (the Board) is created by statute and labeled 
as a state agency.22 The Board is statutorily charged with creat-
ing, administering, and enforcing the State’s licensing system.23 
As a State agency, the Board is subject to North Carolina’s Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, § 150B–1 et seq.24 In all these ways, 
the Board is similar to a traditional state agency. While the 
North Carolina Board is not necessarily representative of all oc-
cupational licensing boards, preliminary research suggests that 
it is not unreasonable to use the specific example of the North 
Carolina Board as a proxy for conceptualizing the statutory char-
acteristics of many occupational licensing boards across the 
country.25  
State licensing boards are unlike traditional state agencies, 
however, in that they are generally comprised of private parties, 
rather than full-time employees of the state. The vast majority 
of occupational boards are made up at least in part of industry 
insiders.26 This is a common practice because industry insiders 
often have a great deal of experience in the regulation of their 
profession, and for this reason are uniquely qualified to serve on 
occupational licensing boards.27 In addition, industry insiders 
 
 20. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 2900–2996.6 (West 1968). 
 21. MINN. STAT. §§ 147.01–.37 (2017). 
 22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22(b) (2017). For an example of how the Min-
nesota Board of Medical Practice is similarly classified as a state agency, see 
also ROBERT A. LEACH, MINN. BD. OF MED. PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE LEGISLA-
TURE IN COMPLIANCE WITH MINNESOTA STATUTES SECTION 3D.06 (SUNSET RE-
VIEW) 2 (2012). 
 23. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-29 to 90-41 (2017). 
 24. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2015). 
 25. The review of state boards and their authorizing statutes conducted in 
the course of this research has not produced any substantial deviations from the 
general pattern of (1) state authorization; (2) delegation of legislative authority 
for a public purpose; and (3) applicability of administrative statutes to the board 
in question. 
 26. Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1570 (discussing how eighty-five percent 
of licensing boards in 2017 were statutorily required to be made up of active 
market participants). 
 27. See Occupational Licensing: Regulation and Licensing: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law Before the 
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are more able and willing to volunteer their time for government 
service, or to accept lower compensation than academic experts 
not otherwise employed.28 This results in a lower cost to state 
governments.29  
Because licensing boards are created by statute and perform 
regulatory functions with authority delegated by the state legis-
lature, but are comprised primarily of private actors, these 
boards may be considered public-private partnerships. State li-
censing boards stand alongside a growing number of public-pri-
vate partnerships that exist in both the federal and state regu-
latory spheres.30 The public-private nature of the Board was 
central to the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina Den-
tal.31 The Court took pains to underscore the perverse incentives 
that may drive boards “dominated” by market participants to 
reach anticompetitive regulatory decisions.32 North Carolina 
Dental joins a catalog of cases in which the Supreme Court has 
 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 6 (2017) [hereinafter Hearing on Occu-
pational Licensing] (written statement of Sarah Oxenham Allen, Senior Assis-
tant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Unit, Office of the Virginia Att’y Gen.), https://docs 
.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20170912/106382/HHRG-115-JU05-Wstate 
-AllenS-20170912.pdf (noting the market expertise that active practitioners 
bring to licensing boards). Justice Breyer observed at oral argument that brain 
surgeons are better positioned to decide “who can practice brain surgery in this 
State” than “a group of bureaucrats.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, N.C. 
Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_transcripts/2014/13-534_l6h1.pdf.  But see Allensworth, 
supra note 7, at 1570 (“[S]elf-regulation may allow for expertise in decision mak-
ing, but it comes at a very high price in the form of professional self-dealing.”). 
 28. See Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27, at 5 (written 
statement of Sarah Oxenham Allen) (noting the high cost of removing market 
participants from all state regulatory boards because “most market-participant 
board members are unpaid”). 
 29. See id. 
 30. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New 
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 816 (2000) (discussing the role of 
non-government actors in the exercise of administrative authority); Orly Lobel, 
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contem-
porary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 376–79, 469–70 (2004) (heralding 
new public/private partnerships as the new frontier in administrative law); see 
also DOT v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232 (2015) (discussing the 
constitutionality of Amtrak, a paradigm of public/private partnerships in the 
modern administrative state, in which Congress vested public standard setting 
authority in Amtrak, while simultaneously designating Amtrak as a private, 
non-governmental corporation). 
 31. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1105 (“Limits on state-action immunity are 
most essential when the State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active 
market participants.”). 
 32. Id. at 1106. 
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taken issue with the legality of private or partially-private insti-
tutions exercising public regulatory power.33 The dual nature of 
the Board was a key contributor to the Court’s finding of illegal-
ity, and this feature of licensing boards should not be overlooked.  
B. OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND 
CURRENT CRITICISMS 
Occupational licensing boards exist in every state, and are 
responsible for regulating hundreds of professions across the 
country.34 Professional licensing has grown dramatically in re-
cent decades.35 This increase has been driven in part by the ex-
pansion of the service economy,36 as an increasing number of 
boards are commissioned to protect consumer welfare.37 As li-
censing has proliferated the U.S. economy, professional licensing 
boards have not been without their critics—which hail from both 
political and academic spheres.  
1. Historical Background and Current Scope of Occupational 
Licensing Boards 
In 2017, there were 1790 state occupational licensing boards 
in the United States.38 These boards engage in a variety of activ-
ities, including: sanctioning practitioners; responding to con-
 
 33. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. at 1232 (analyzing the status of 
Amtrak considering its pseudo-private status and regulatory powers); Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310–11 (1936) (noting that the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act of 1934 may be unconstitutional for delegating legislative 
power to private parties); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495, 550–51 (1935) (striking down delegation of regulatory power to private 
parties). 
 34. STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC 
STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION OF STATE REGULATORY BOARDS CON-
TROLLED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS 1 (2015) [hereinafter FTC STAFF GUID-
ANCE]. 
 35. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of 
Occupational Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 677, 678 (2010). 
 36. In 2006, seventy-seven percent of jobs in the U.S. economy were in the 
service sector. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, Industry Output 
and Employment Projections to 2018: Table 2.1. Employment by Major Industry 
Sector, 2006, 2016, and Projected 2026, MONTHLY LAB. REV., http://www.bls 
.gov/emp/ep_table_201.htm (last modified Oct. 24, 2017). This same report 
found that twenty-nine of the thirty fastest growing jobs were located in the 
service sector. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 147.001 (2017) (“The primary responsibility and 
obligation of the Board of Medical Practice is to protect the public.”). 
 38. Allensworth, supra note 7. 
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sumer complaints; prohibiting deceptive advertising; and circu-
lating industry information to the public.39 However, boards’ 
most relevant function for purposes of this discussion is licen-
sure, or determining who may act as a provider in a regulated 
market. Medicine and law are examples of professions that have 
traditionally required licensure.40 As state economies and ser-
vice industries have grown, so too has occupational licensing. In 
2015, over 800 distinct occupations in the United States required 
practitioners to be licensed.41 Regulated occupations range from 
cosmetologists to interior designers.42 Approximately one in four 
U.S. workers required a license to perform their chosen occupa-
tion in 2015; in the 1950s, that rate was just one in twenty.43  
2. Criticisms of Occupational Licensing 
Critics of occupational licensing argue that licensing boards 
overstep their intended purpose of providing for consumer 
health and welfare, and insulate economic incumbents by keep-
ing would-be competitors out of the market.44 Critics point out 
that state governments derive some financial benefit by collect-
ing licensure fees.45 Additionally, regulated professionals and 
 
 39. See ABRAHAM L. WICKELGREN, RESPONDING TO THE NORTH CAROLINA 
DENTAL DECISION: A PRIMER FOR STATE REGULATORY BOARD COUNSEL AND 
BOARD SUPERVISORS 19–22 (2017) (identifying functions of regulatory boards 
other than licensing that may carry varying degrees of antitrust liability). 
 40. See FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 34. But see Allensworth, supra 
note 7, at 1570 (suggesting that traditionally licensed occupations like law and 
medicine are “inefficiently regulated in ways that increase wages without ad-
dressing quality,” and as a result, licensure schemes in these professions should 
be subjected to scrutiny). 
 41. FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 34 (citing Aaron Edlin & Rebecca 
Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust 
Scrutiny, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2014)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 35. 
 44. See Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27 (testimony of 
Robert Everett Johnson, Att’y, Institute for Justice). 
 45. See Gerald S. Kerska, Economic Protectionism and Occupational Li-
censing Reform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1703, 1741 (2017) (citing State Tax Collection 
Sources 2000–2013, TAX POL’Y CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/ 
state-tax-collection-sources-2000-2013 (last visited Oct. 14, 2018)). But see 
MINN. STAT. § 214.06 (2017) (authorizing licensing boards, other than for 
health-related occupations, to collect sufficient relicensing fees to cover the 
board’s anticipated expenditures, and not more).  
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trade associations have a powerful voice in lobbying state gov-
ernments to implement and sustain licensure requirements.46  
Critics of occupational licensing hail from both sides of the 
political aisle. In 2015, the Obama Administration issued a re-
port outlining the economic harms of occupational regulation.47 
In 2017, federal legislation denouncing occupational board over-
regulation was introduced by a slate of Republican lawmakers.48 
Advocates for licensing reform can be found in the federal gov-
ernment,49 academia,50 and the media.51 According to the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, “Unnecessary licensing restrictions 
erect significant barriers and impose costs that cause real harm 
to American workers, employers, consumers and our economy as 
a whole, with no measurable benefits to consumers or society.”52 
 
 46. See Kerska, supra note 45, at 1724–25 (discussing the motivations and 
impacts of economic incumbents lobbying lawmakers to maintain high barriers 
to entry). 
 47. Compare OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., OCCU-
PATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS (2015), https:// 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_ 
nonembargo.pdf, with the policy of least-restrictive alternatives to licensing and 
the anti-licensure rhetoric in the Restoring Board Immunity Act, sponsored by 
Republican Congressmen. Restoring Board Immunity Act of 2017, H.R. 3446, 
115th Cong. (2017). In the House of Representatives, the bill is sponsored by 
Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA), and co-sponsored by Representative Tim 
Walberg (R-MI). H.R. 3446-RBI Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/ 
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3446/cosponsors (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). In 
the Senate, the bill is sponsored by Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) and co-sponsored 
by Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Ben Sasse (R-NE). S. 1649-RBI Act, CON-
GRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1649/ 
cosponsors (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
 48. See supra note 47. The bill is intended to “help States combat abuse of 
occupational licensing laws by economic incumbents.” H.R. 3446; see also S. 
1649, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 49. See License to Compete: Occupational Licensing and the State Action 
Doctrine: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Con-
sumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016) (written 
statement of the Federal Trade Commission). 
 50. See, e.g., Allensworth, supra note 7. 
 51. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Moving to Arizona Soon? You Might Need a 
License, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/ 
business/economy/job-licenses.html; Josh Zumbrun, Occupational Licenses May 
Be Bad for the Economy, But Good for Workers Who Have Them, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/04/18/occupational 
-licenses-may-be-bad-for-the-economy-but-good-for-workers-who-have-them. 
 52. Economic Liberty: Opening Doors to Opportunity, FED. TRADE COMMIS-
SION, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/economic-liberty (last visited Oct. 14, 
2018); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF POLICY PAPER, POLICY PERSPEC-
TIVES: COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE REGIS-
TERED NURSES (2014) (advocating for avoidance of unnecessary regulation); 
Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Daniel E. Shearouse, 
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In 2015, the Obama Administration issued a report finding that 
unnecessary licensing requirements “raise the price of goods and 
services, restrict employment opportunities, and make it more 
difficult for workers to take their skills across state lines.”53 Spe-
cial interest groups including the Institute for Justice,54 the Her-
itage Foundation,55 the Brookings Institution,56 and Reason 
Foundation57 all advocate for reducing occupational licensing re-
quirements.  
Critics have challenged occupational licensing as an uncon-
stitutional restriction of free speech,58 as a due process violation, 
and as denial of equal protection under the law.59 Licensing laws 
are criticized as disproportionately burdening military fami-
lies,60 and people in low-paying jobs.61 Licensing has also been 
 
Clerk of Court, Supreme Court of S.C. (Apr. 15, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-and-department-justice 
-comment-south-carolina-supreme-court-concerning-proposed-guidelines/ 
v080010sc.pdf (describing their comment before the South Carolina Supreme 
Court concerning proposed guidelines for residential and commercial real estate 
closings). 
 53. OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., supra note 47, at 
3. 
 54. Paul Avelar & Nick Sibilla, Untangling Regulations, INST. FOR JUST., 
http://ij.org/report/untangling-regulations (last visited Oct. 14, 2018); Ari Bar-
gil, Florida’s Dirty Dozen, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/report/floridas-dirty 
-dozen (last visited Oct. 14, 2018); Dick M. Carpenter, II et al., License to Work, 
INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/report/license-work-2 (last visited Oct. 14, 2018); 
Economic Liberty, INST. FOR JUST., http://ij.org/pillar/economic-liberty/?post_ 
type=case (last visited Oct. 14, 2018); Entrepreneurial Survival Guide, INST. 
FOR JUST., http://ij.org/report/entrepreneurs-survival-guide (last visited Oct. 14, 
2018). 
 55. James Sherk, Creating Opportunity in the Workplace, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/ 
creating-opportunity-the-workplace. 
 56. MORRIS M. KLEINER, HAMILTON PROJECT, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL 
LICENSING POLICIES (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/06/THP_KleinerDiscPaper_final.pdf. 
 57. ADAM B. SUMMERS, REASON FOUND., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: 
RANKING THE STATES AND EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES (2007), https://reason.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/files/762c8fe96431b6fa5e27ca64eaa1818b.pdf. 
 58. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Del Castillo v. 
Philip, No. 3:17-cv-00722 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2017) (challenging restriction of 
plaintiff ’s freedom to provide dietary advice on free speech grounds). 
 59. See Martinez v. Mullen, 11 F. Supp. 3d 149, 152 (D. Conn. 2014), aff ’d 
sub nom. Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F. 3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015) (chal-
lenging restriction on non-dentist teeth whitening services as a deprivation of 
the due process right to engage in a lawful profession). 
 60. See Kerska, supra note 45, at 1707–08. 
 61. See Dick M. Carpenter, II et al., The Occupations, INST. FOR JUST., 
http://ij.org/report/license-to-work/the-occupations (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) 
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accused of perpetuating and steepening income inequality in the 
United States.62 Beyond these arguments that licensing laws 
create economic victims, many argue that licensing laws hurt the 
economy as a whole. Economists estimate that occupational li-
censing costs consumers between $116 and $139 billion annually 
in the form of higher-priced services.63 The economic, constitu-
tional, and social-policy based criticisms of occupational licens-
ing make clear that, regardless of the intentions of state licens-
ing, the effects are more far-reaching than merely protecting 
consumers.  
C. NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL AND A NEW ERA OF ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT  
Prior to North Carolina Dental, the majority view was that 
occupational regulatory boards, as state agencies, were immune 
from antitrust liability under the state action immunity doc-
trine.64 In North Carolina Dental, however, the Supreme Court 
held that occupational licensing boards controlled by market 
participants are not entitled to state action immunity because 
members have a strong incentive to act in their own interest ra-
ther than in the public interest.65 This Section describes the gen-
esis and evolution of the state action immunity doctrine, then 
explains how North Carolina Dental built on that doctrine to 
change antitrust liability facing “hybrid” state actors, or arms of 
the state controlled in part by private persons.  
 
(noting the prevalence of licensing requirements in low- and moderate-income 
occupations). 
 62. See Jonathan Rothwell, Myths of the 1 Percent: What Puts People at the 
Top, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/upshot/ 
income-inequality-united-states.html. 
 63. MORRIS M. KLEINER, LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR 
RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 115 (2006). 
 64. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943) (suggesting that tra-
ditional state agencies are likely immune to antitrust challenges, because the 
Court held that the Commission’s execution of a statutory prorate program was 
entitled to state action immunity). But see Edlin & Haw, supra note 41 (ques-
tioning status of immunity prior to North Carolina Dental). 
 65. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1105–06 
(2015). 
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1. An Overview of the State Action Immunity Doctrine Prior 
to North Carolina Dental 
Federal antitrust law is intended to encourage competition 
and preserve free markets by strongly disincentivizing anticom-
petitive conduct.66 However, the Supreme Court has held that 
states acting in their sovereign capacities are entitled to restrain 
competition if doing so furthers other public goals.67 This doc-
trine is known as state action immunity. Many commentators 
view the development of state action immunity as a necessary 
restriction on the reach of federal antitrust law.68 After the New 
Deal Era expansion of the Commerce Clause, the reach of the 
federal government to regulate intrastate matters increased dra-
matically.69 This in turn expanded the application of federal an-
titrust statutes like the Sherman Act far beyond the expecta-
tions of the enacting Congress, which could not have anticipated 
that federal antitrust law would be used to prosecute state-level 
officials.70  
The Supreme Court introduced the concept of state action 
immunity in the 1943 case Parker v. Brown.71 In this case, a Cal-
ifornia raisin producer challenged a state statute authorizing a 
program controlling marketing of the raisin crop.72 The statute 
at issue authorized programs to restrict competition among 
growers and maintain prices in order to serve a public goal other 
than competition—specifically, to “conserve the agricultural 
wealth of the State.”73 The plaintiff-raisin producer challenged 
the validity of the program on several grounds, including the 
 
 66. See id. at 1109 (“Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the 
Nation’s free market structures . . . . The antitrust laws declare a considered 
and decisive prohibition by the Federal Government of cartels, price fixing, and 
other combinations or practices that undermine the free market.”). 
 67. Id. (holding that state legislatures may “impose restrictions on occupa-
tions, confer exclusive or shared rights to dominate a market, or otherwise limit 
competition to achieve public objectives”); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. Boulder, 455 
U.S. 40, 53 (1982) (holding that “the States possess a significant measure of 
sovereignty” and are thus entitled to enact legislation that restrains competi-
tion in order to further public ends). 
 68. See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The New Antitrust Federalism, 102 VA. 
L. REV. 1387, 1390 (2016). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 72. Id. at 344. 
 73. Id. at 346. 
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Sherman Act.74 If the marketing program had been an agree-
ment between private persons, the program would have violated 
the Sherman Act.75 However, because the program was orga-
nized under state law, no antitrust liability attached. The Court 
explained, “We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act 
or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain 
a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its leg-
islature.”76 The Court held that the Sherman Act is intended to 
govern individual private action, and not state action. Thus, the 
state action immunity doctrine was born.  
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of state action im-
munity in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Alu-
minum, decided in 1980.77 Here, the Court addressed the ap-
plicability of state action immunity to programs in which the 
state government is a passive facilitator, rather than an active 
administrator.78 The state government in Midcal was passive in 
the sense that, although the state legislature consented to a spe-
cific regulatory scheme, the scheme was ultimately administered 
by private parties without state oversight.79 Under California’s 
price maintenance statutes for wholesale wine trade, wine pro-
ducers and wholesalers were required to file contracts with the 
state.80 These contracts governed the price at which wholesalers 
were permitted to sell producers’ wines to individual mer-
chants.81 If no contract existed, wholesalers filed a price sched-
ule.82 Schedules and contracts for each producer’s wines were 
binding on all wholesalers in the defined trading area.83 The 
State of California exerted no control over wine prices, and did 
not review the reasonableness of the filed contracts or price 
schedules.84 
As in Parker, the Court held that California’s statutory 
scheme for fixing wholesale wine prices would plainly violate the 
 
 74. Id. at 348–49. 
 75. Id. at 350. 
 76. Id. at 350–51. 
 77. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 
(1980). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 99. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 99‒100. 
 84. Id. 
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Sherman Act if it were organized by private parties.85 Next, the 
Court moved to consider “whether the State’s involvement in the 
price-setting program [was] sufficient to establish antitrust im-
munity under Parker.”86 To answer this question, Midcal laid 
down a two-part test.87 First, there must be a “clearly articulated 
and affirmatively expressed” state policy intending to displace 
competition.88 Second, the state must actively supervise the ac-
tor charged with executing the policy.89  
The Court held that the wine pricing scheme met the first 
prong but failed the second, and as a result was not entitled to 
antitrust immunity.90 The Court found insufficient evidence of 
active state supervision, noting that the state did “not monitor 
market conditions,” engage in examination of the statutory pro-
gram, or regulate the terms of the contracts or price schedules.91 
The fact that the price fixing scheme was statutorily endorsed 
by the state did not excuse the fact that it was principally a pri-
vate agreement which had received the blessing of the California 
State legislature.92 In the absence of active state supervision, the 
Court held, “The national policy in favor of competition cannot 
be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement 
over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”93  
Finally, in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the Court 
considered the applicability of state action immunity to munici-
palities.94 The Court held that cities are unlike private persons 
 
 85. Id. at 103. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 105. 
 88. Id. (internal citations omitted). In most antitrust claims against state 
licensing boards, Midcal’s first prong will be easily met, and litigation will hinge 
primarily on whether the active supervision requirement is fulfilled. See Al-
lensworth, supra note 7, at 1584 (“Boards typically meet the ‘clear articulation’ 
prong easily; courts have held that the ubiquitous statutory language giving 
licensing boards the authority to create professional entry and practice require-
ments suffices.” (citing Benson v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 673 F.2d 
272, 275–76 (9th Cir. 1982))). For a more robust discussion of Midcal’s first 
prong, see FTC v. Pheobe Putney Health System, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1013 
(2013), holding that the clear articulation requirement is satisfied where “the 
displacement of competition [is] the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the 
exercise of authority delegated by the state legislature.” 
 89. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 105–06. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 106. 
 94. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985). 
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seeking state sanctioning of otherwise anticompetitive agree-
ments, like the producers and wholesalers in Midcal, because 
cities are public institutions unlikely to have self-interested mo-
tivations in issuing these regulations.95 However, cities do not 
act with the sovereignty of the state legislature, and as such are 
not entitled to Parker immunity.96 Attempting to chart a middle 
ground, the Court held that cities are immune to antitrust chal-
lenges as long as they satisfy Midcal’s first prong—acting in ac-
cordance with a clearly articulated state policy.97 Hallie thus cre-
ated a “shortcut” for public actors like cities, which lack the 
sovereignty of the state legislature or state supreme court.98  
2. State Action Immunity and Occupational Licensing Boards 
After North Carolina Dental  
Prior to North Carolina Dental, many states operated under 
the assumption that licensing boards were immune to antitrust 
liability under the state action doctrine of Parker, or at least 
were subject only to the clear articulation requirement under 
Hallie’s shortcut.99 However, in North Carolina Dental, the 
Court found that the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners 
was more similar to a private group, like a trade association, 
than a traditional state agency.100 In so holding, the Court spe-
cifically noted the inherent danger of market participant board 
members acting in self-serving ways rather than in the public 
interest.101 As a result, the Court held that the antitrust claim 
facing the Board was subject to review under Midcal’s two-part 
 
 95. Id. at 47. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 46 (“The active state supervision requirement should not be im-
posed in cases in which the actor is a municipality.”). 
 98. See Allensworth, supra note 68, at 1400 (describing Hallie’s “shortcut”). 
 99. See, e.g., Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6, at 4–5. But see Hoover v. 
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 579–81 (1984) (holding that an accountancy board limit-
ing the number of new licenses to be issued could be subject to antitrust scrutiny 
if the state supreme court did not have ultimate authority over the issue); Bates 
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1977) (holding that a board con-
trolled by attorneys was immune from antitrust concerns only because the 
adopting regulations deterring attorneys from advertising or engaging in price 
competition was ultimately the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision). Thus, while 
many state occupational boards assumed that they were entitled to antitrust 
immunity under the state action doctrine, there is ample Supreme Court case 
law prior to North Carolina Dental suggesting that boards fully controlled by 
market participants are not immune to antitrust challenges. 
 100. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2015). 
 101. Id. at 1116‒17. 
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test.102 The Court found that the Board failed to satisfy Midcal’s 
active supervision requirement, and as a result had violated the 
Sherman Act without the cover of state action immunity.103  
Understanding the nuances and implications of the Court’s 
holding in North Carolina Dental requires a brief review of the 
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Practicing den-
tists had complained to the Board that non-dentists were offer-
ing teeth whitening services at below-market rates.104 In re-
sponse, the Board issued cease and desist letters to providers of 
teeth whitening services acting without a dentistry license.105 
The issuance of the cease and desist letters ultimately led to the 
Board’s liability under the Sherman Act.106 The decision to issue 
the cease and desist letters was not subject to review by the 
state.107 In addition, the decision to issue cease and desist letters 
rather than taking the non-dentist teeth whiteners to court 
meant that the Board’s action was self-executing, in that it did 
not require approval or ratification by any independent body in 
order to be effective.108 The Board’s determination that the term 
dentistry in its authorizing statute included the practice of teeth 
whitening was similarly unsupervised by the State.109 Accord-
ingly, once the Court decided that the Board was not subject to 
Parker immunity or Hallie’s shortcut, but rather to Midcal’s two-
prong test, the case had essentially been decided against the 
Board.110  
North Carolina Dental is problematic for state occupational 
licensing boards for two main reasons: it creates a heavy liability 
 
 102. See id. at 1114 (“The Court holds today that a state board on which a 
controlling number of decisionmakers are active market participants in the oc-
cupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s active supervision require-
ment in order to invoke state-action antitrust immunity.”). 
 103. Id. at 1117. 
 104. Id. at 1108. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1108‒09. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–11, N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 
(No. 13-543) (raising the issue of self-executing board action in a question by 
Justice Ginsburg, who stated, “[Y]ou can have such a board, but there needs to 
be a check of supervision; that is, they can’t just go make their regulations with-
out approval from some State entity and they can’t go around issuing cease and 
desist orders. They have to come to a court . . . and the court would act as a 
check”); see also WICKELGREN, supra note 39, at 13 (noting that when a board 
“enforces a statute on its own,” the action carries antitrust risk, but the board 
is likely “immune if it asks the court to enforce the statute”). 
 109. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1110. 
 110. Id. at 1105–06. 
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risk, and is light on guidance regarding how to comply with the 
legal framework it sets out.  
First, antitrust suits are notoriously complex and expensive 
to defend, not least of all because the Sherman Act awards auto-
matic treble damages.111 Much of what occupational boards do in 
terms of regulating service providers is subject to attack under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which provides, that “[e]very con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce” is illegal.112 The legal exposure of the approximately 1790 
occupational boards across the United States is therefore sub-
stantial.113  
Second, the North Carolina Dental decision is ambiguous 
and vague in several respects. The decision fails to define what 
it means for a board to be “dominated” by market participants—
a condition the opinion suggests is necessary to trigger Midcal’s 
two-pronged scrutiny.114 To this end, advisory opinions have 
counseled states to understand any number of active market 
participants on the board—even a single member—makes Par-
ker’s automatic state action immunity unavailable.115  
The North Carolina Dental decision is also ambiguous re-
garding the requirements of active state supervision, merely 
stating that this is a context-dependent inquiry.116 The Court at-
tempts by negative definition to sketch the shape of adequate 
active supervision processes, explaining that the mere option to 
veto board action is insufficient.117 Ultimately, however, there is 
scarce guidance regarding how to fulfill Midcal’s second prong, 
and it will be up to the lower courts to define what is necessary 
through litigation.  
On the issue of active state supervision, not only does North 
Carolina Dental leave unresolved the question of which pro-
cesses are required to constitute active supervision, it also fails 
 
 111. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). Justice Kennedy raised this same issue at 
Oral Argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 
(No. 13-543) (“[I]f I were a private practitioner and . . . a neurologist came to me 
and said, I think it’s important for us to do standards, can I get on this board? I 
say, have no part of it. Triple damages, attorneys’ fees. You can’t even afford to 
defend this case. Get off that board.”). Justice Breyer also raised the issue of 
treble damages at Oral Argument. Id. at 31. 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  
 113. Allensworth, supra note 7. 
 114. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1106. 
 115. See WICKELGREN, supra note 39, at 4. 
 116. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1106–07. 
 117. Id. at 1107. 
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to address the necessary composition of the supervising body. 
Stated differently, North Carolina Dental provides little to no 
instruction regarding how supervision ought to be achieved or 
who should do the supervising.  
On the issue of who should be doing the supervising, Midcal 
dictates that immunity attaches where the supervising body acts 
with the sovereign power of the state.118 It is unclear, however, 
which state bodies act with sufficient state sovereignty, and 
which do not. At oral argument, Justice Breyer used the term 
“Stateness” to refer to the degree to which a given public body 
has the sovereign properties of the state.119 To trigger state ac-
tion immunity, the supervising body must act with sufficient 
“Stateness” to transform the ruling of the board into the ruling 
of the state.120 Where the line of sufficient “Stateness” lies is un-
settled, and the Court has provided very little by way of guide-
posts to inform the analysis. State legislatures and state su-
preme courts plainly act with sufficient “Stateness.”121 However, 
it is impractical to require the legislature or supreme court to 
substantively review and affirmatively adopt every recommen-
dation of each professional licensing board in the state. Author-
izing a traditional state agency with no market participants to 
review and adopt licensing board decisions is likely, but not cer-
tain, to carry sufficient “Stateness.”122 Hallie dictates that cities 
do not act with sufficient “Stateness” absent a clearly articulated 
policy to displace competition, but the sovereign status of state 
bodies between a state legislature and supreme court on one 
pole, and cities on the other, leaves much to be defined.123  
 
 118. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 103–
04 (1980). 
 119. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 
13-534). 
 120. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 103–04. 
 121. There is a general consensus that acts of state supreme courts and state 
legislatures are sovereign state acts entitled to immunity. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 29, N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534) (discussing that state 
supreme courts and legislatures act on behalf of the state). 
 122. Allensworth, supra note 68, at 1435‒36 (“[T]he NC Dental [sic] Court’s 
declaration can be read as indicating that an inherently captured board can no 
longer bootstrap the supervision requirement by reporting to another version of 
itself: a self-interested sub-state entity. That leaves two possible categories of 
supervisors: sovereign branches of the state government or sub-state entities 
that are not so self-interested as to need supervision themselves.”). 
 123. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38‒40 (1985). 
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In sum, the ambiguities that follow from North Carolina 
Dental are substantial. States have very little guidance regard-
ing: (1) at what point boards are considered “dominated” by mar-
ket participants; (2) the review processes necessary to constitute 
“active supervision;” or (3) the composition of the state body re-
sponsible for supervision. The result is a confused and jumbled 
area of the Court’s jurisprudence. The opaque nature of the law 
can only encourage further litigation, ratcheting states’ liability 
risk under North Carolina Dental ever higher. 
D. STATE RESPONSES TO NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL 
Many states acted quickly to address the newly recognized 
antitrust liability facing regulatory boards under North Carolina 
Dental. State responses aimed at fulfilling the active supervision 
requirements of Midcal’s second prong have taken various 
forms, including executive orders,124 state attorneys’ general 
opinions,125 and legislation attempting to establish state action 
immunity.126  
Connecticut, for example, amended its existing statutes, ef-
fective 2016, to give the Commissioner of Consumer Protection 
greater power over the boards overseen by the department.127 
The authorizing statute was amended so that any licensing or 
certification-related decision of the board with adverse conse-
quences to a party is considered a recommendation, subject to 
the commissioner’s final decision.128 Similar amendments were 
made to authorizing statutes for boards under Connecticut’s De-
partment of Education129 and the Department of Public 
Health.130 Similarly, Georgia acted quickly to pass legislation 
giving the governor supervisory power over decisions made by 
occupational licensing boards across the state.131  
Other states have central review offices currently in place 
likely to satisfy Midcal’s requirement that board decisions are 
 
 124. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (cataloging executive orders 
out of Delaware and Oklahoma). 
 125. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (highlighting California, Flor-
ida, and Idaho as states responding with state attorneys’ general opinions). 
 126. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (taking note of legislative re-
sponses in Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, and North Carolina). 
 127. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-7 (2017). 
 128. Id. § 21a-7(a)(1). 
 129. Id. § 10-153f(b). 
 130. Id. § 20-8a(g). 
 131. See Georgia Professional Regulation Reform Act, H.B. 952, 153d Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ga. 2016) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1C-3). 
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subject to active supervision. Colorado, for example, has a Divi-
sion of Professions and Occupations (DPO), housed in the Colo-
rado Department of Regulatory Agencies (DORA).132 DPO views 
promoting competition in the Colorado business community as a 
primary responsibility of the Office.133 DPO’s core functions are 
licensing, regulation, and investigation of consumer complaints 
across approximately fifty occupations.134 Outside of merely 
overseeing licensing decisions, DPO helps to set a regulatory 
agenda for the State, which in recent years has included: inten-
sifying regulation and licensing requirements for the massage 
industry in response to human trafficking violations;135 prevent-
ing diversion of controlled substances by healthcare practition-
ers, particularly in the face of the opioid epidemic;136 and relax-
ing licensure requirements for mental health practitioners in 
response to a statewide labor shortage.137 DPO goes beyond 
merely adding an additional layer of bureaucracy, giving board 
licensure decisions the State’s rubber-stamped seal of approval. 
Instead, DPO helps to unify regulatory and licensing efforts 
across the state, and drives efficiencies by using common sys-
tems to recruit and license qualified practitioners, conduct inves-
tigations and inspections, communicate with and educate con-
sumers and industry practitioners, and administer regulatory 
programs.138 
Similarly, California’s licensing boards are already centrally 
housed within the Department of Consumer Affairs.139 In an 
opinion letter issued just months after North Carolina Dental 
was issued, California State Attorney General Kamala Harris 
opined that California could comply with North Carolina Dental 
with “minimal adjustments to procedures and outlooks” by using 
“existing resources” to create “lines of active supervision . . . for 
the boards’ most market-sensitive actions.”140  
 
 132. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-102 (2016) (creating the Division of Pro-
fessions and Occupations). 
 133. COLO. DEP’T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, FY 2016/2017 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1‒2 (2017) (acknowledging competitive considerations). 
 134. Id. at 4. 
 135. Id. at 22. 
 136. Id. at 8‒9. 
 137. Id. at 21. 
 138. See id. at 1‒2 (explaining the mission of the Division of Professions and 
Occupations and its enacted initiatives). 
 139. Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6, at 13. 
 140. Id. 
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Existing state structures such as those in Connecticut, Col-
orado, and California, have the advantage of already being in-
grained in state regulatory and licensure systems. Reliance on 
these structures also has the benefit of preventing duplicative 
regulation between state and federal governments.  
E. THE RESTORING BOARD IMMUNITY ACT OF 2017: A FEDERAL 
RESPONSE TO NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL  
In addition to legislative responses from states, federal law-
makers also introduced legislation seeking to address the in-
creased liability of state occupational boards. In July of 2017, 
identical versions of the Restoring Board Immunity Act (RBI 
Act) were introduced in the House and Senate.141 At the time of 
this writing, both bills were pending in committee.142  
The RBI Act outlines two paths to immunity for state licens-
ing boards. States may either establish a “mechanism for mean-
ingful active supervision of licensing boards by State officials” or 
establish a “mechanism for meaningful judicial review of board 
actions in the State courts.”143 Hereafter, these two paths to im-
munity will be referred to as “active supervision” and “judicial 
review,” respectively. The bill mandates procedures that boards 
making licensing decisions must follow.144 Other functions of 
state occupational boards are not addressed by the RBI Act, and 
the statute provides no means of obtaining antitrust immunity 
for acts of the board not related to licensing.145  
1. Obtaining Immunity via Active State Supervision  
To gain immunity through active supervision, the following 
elements must be met: First, the board must be acting pursuant 
to a nonfrivolous interpretation of state law.146 This requirement 
is largely equivalent to the “clearly articulated policy,” or the 
first prong of Midcal.147 Second, the State must adopt a policy of 
 
 141. H.R. 3446, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1649, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 142. This information is still accurate as of September 4, 2018. 
 143. H.R. 3446 § 2(1). 
 144. Id. § 5. 
 145. Marketing plans like the one adopted in Midcal to control cost and sup-
ply, for example, do not implicate licensing, but do implicate antitrust concerns. 
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 99 (1980). 
Restrictions on advertisements and inconsistent enforcement of occupational 
regulations are other examples of anticompetitive actions boards may take that 
are not related to licensing. 
 146. H.R. 3446 § 5(a)(1). 
 147. Id. 
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using “less restrictive alternatives” to licensing whenever possi-
ble.148  
a. Part One: State Implementation of Federal Policy 
For boards to receive immunity under the RBI Act, a state 
must adopt the RBI Act’s licensure policy.149 Under this policy, 
less restrictive alternatives must be used in lieu of licensing 
across all regulated professions, unless adoption of alternatives 
will not suffice to protect consumers from “real, substantial 
threats to public health, safety, or welfare.”150 The bill defines 
less restrictive alternatives as “inspections, bonding or insur-
ance requirements, registration, and voluntary certification.”151  
In addition to substituting less restrictive alternatives 
wherever health, safety, and welfare concerns allow, a state 
must also adopt a policy of construing the authority of licensing 
boards narrowly, covering only individuals selling “goods or ser-
vices that are included explicitly in the statute or regulation.”152 
Under this construction, the North Carolina Board of Dental Ex-
aminers would have lacked power to regulate teeth whiteners, 
because teeth whitening is not explicitly included in the statu-
tory definition of dentistry.153  
b. Part Two: State Implementation of Federal Legislation 
To achieve immunity under the RBI Act, a state must enact 
legislation providing for active supervision of all licensing deci-
sions made by all occupational licensing boards.154 This entails 
the establishment of an Office of Supervision of Occupational 
Boards (Office) to review board licensing activity and audit for 
compliance with the policy outlined above.155 To be enforceable, 
board decisions must be affirmatively endorsed in writing by the 
Office.156 The statute outlines with some detail the responsibili-
 
 148. Id. § 3(5). 
 149. See id. § 4(b) (requiring states to perform the licensure policy obliga-
tions listed in sections five and six to receive immunity). 
 150. Id. § 5(a)(2). 
 151. Id. § 2(4). 
 152. Id. § 5(b)(3). 
 153. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015). 
 154. H.R. 3446 § 5(c). 
 155. Id. § 5(c)(2)(A). 
 156. Id. § 5(c)(2)(B)(i). 
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ties of the Office, its interaction with state boards, and its com-
position.157 In addition, a state must review all existing occupa-
tional regulations for compliance with the policy outlined 
above.158 Over a five-year period, a state must determine 
whether any currently existing licensing requirements may be 
replaced with less restrictive alternatives.159  
2. Obtaining Immunity via Judicial Review 
The path to immunity through judicial review mirrors the 
active supervision path. The judicial review path also requires 
states to adopt federal law and implement federal policy. In ad-
dition, a state must create a private right of action to prevent 
enforcement of occupational licensing laws.160 Judicial review of 
the licensing requirement must be de novo, and may not rely on 
“hypothetical risks to public safety” to justify the licensure 
law.161  
II.  THE EXTENT OF BOARD EXPOSURE UNDER NORTH 
CAROLINA DENTAL AND THE EFFICACY OF RESCUE 
LEGISLATION   
After North Carolina Dental was decided, state boards 
moved from presumed antitrust immunity to potential liability 
for any market-sensitive act.162 However, given the scope of the 
legislative and executive response to this increased litigation 
risk, it is worth examining whether the litigation risk facing 
state boards is substantial enough to justify such a reactionary 
outpour. After reviewing the risk posed to states, state boards, 
and individual board members, this Part will survey litigation 
that has followed North Carolina Dental to date in order to es-
tablish a preliminary sense of the legal risk states now bear. Af-
ter concluding that the litigation risk is too great to go un-
addressed by states, this Part will next argue that both federal 
and state legislative responses seeking to limit board liability 
are insufficient, and that a new approach must be sought.  
 
 157. See id. §§ 5(c)(2)–(3) (describing the duties of the office, as well as the 
internal review procedures). 
 158. Id. § 5(c)(5). 
 159. Id. § 5(c)(5)(B). 
 160. Id. § 6(b)(1)(C). 
 161. Id. § 6(b)(2). 
 162. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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A. DEFINING THE TRUE RISK TO STATE BOARDS POST-NORTH 
CAROLINA DENTAL 
North Carolina Dental raises difficult questions of whether 
and to what extent state licensing board members are covered 
by state indemnification regimes, which in many states are de-
signed only to cover more limited risk of liability attaching to due 
process lawsuits. Prior to North Carolina Dental, state licensing 
boards already shouldered substantial litigation risk. Licensing 
boards are regularly sued on due process grounds by applicants 
denied licensure.163 However, antitrust lawsuits are different 
than due process suits in several respects. First, and perhaps 
most relevant to state legislators seeking to protect legal defense 
funds from drainage, antitrust liability under the Sherman Act 
carries treble damages.164 This was not at issue in North Caro-
lina Dental because plaintiffs were seeking only an injunction, 
and no monetary damages.165 Second, antitrust lawsuits are of-
ten highly complex and technical, sometimes involving analysis 
of economic impacts that require expert testimony in a way that 
due process claims do not.166 Antitrust lawsuits are costly to lit-
igate, even when favorably resolved.167  
Part of the reason the response to North Carolina Dental 
has been so substantial may be the sheer number of boards the 
 
 163. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (challenging the deci-
sion of a state medical board on Due Process grounds); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 
U.S. 564 (1973) (challenging the decision of state board of optometry on Due 
Process grounds); see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 
U.S. 373 (1985) (challenging denial of membership in American Academy of Or-
thopedic Surgeons on Due Process grounds). 
 164. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). 
 165. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2015). 
 166. See Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Los-
ing Academic Consensus in the Battle of Experts, 106 NW. L. REV. 1261 (2012) 
(discussing the cost and complexity of expert witness testimony in antitrust lit-
igation). 
 167. In 2017, antitrust and securities litigation combined to make up 
twenty-one percent of all class action defense spending, despite the fact that 
antitrust suits are relatively uncommon. CARLTON FIELDS, THE 2018 CARLTON 
FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY: BEST PRACTICES IN REDUCING COST AND MAN-
AGING RISK IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 7 (2018), https://classactionsurvey 
.com/pdf/2018-class-action-survey.pdf. In 2017, antitrust litigation constituted 
12.6% of all corporate class action defense matters, but accounted for 13.5% of 
spending. Id. Other than consumer fraud, no other type of class action defense 
carried such a disparity between cost of defense and frequency of litigation. Id. 
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decision impacts.168 In 2017, there were 1790 active state licens-
ing boards.169 Almost by definition, licensing boards act to re-
strict access to the market for some providers. Depending on 
facts and circumstances, this may be an anticompetitive act sub-
ject to liability under the Sherman Act. Even in cases where no 
liability is found, the hassle and expense of litigating antitrust 
challenges are substantial. In a recent antitrust case filed 
against a state board of medical examiners in which the board 
was ultimately found not liable, the cost of defending the suit 
was hundreds of thousands of dollars.170  
Further, under the Sherman Act, antitrust liability attaches 
whenever there is an unreasonable restriction of trade, even if 
the board’s action does not eliminate competition, as it did in 
North Carolina Dental.171 Given the nature of the board’s regu-
latory function, if boards are unable to satisfy the clearly articu-
lated policy and active supervision requirements of Midcal, 
much of the board’s activity will be effectively hamstrung by an-
titrust law.172  
The litigation risk discussed above in the context of board 
liability is further exacerbated when considered in the context of 
board members being sued in their individual capacity. The vast 
majority of antitrust suits against state boards filed since North 
Carolina Dental have named board members in their individual 
capacities, seeking damages.173 Defendants in North Carolina 
Dental argued that imposing antitrust liability on state licensing 
boards would create a disincentive to private citizens to serve on 
boards.174 The Court dismissed this concern on the basis that 
most individual board members are indemnified by the state, 
 
 168. See Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1571 (opining that, because pre-North 
Carolina Dental supervision of licensing boards was threadbare in many states, 
and because active market participants “control almost every board,” the mon-
etary risk to states under North Carolina Dental is substantial). 
 169. Id. at 1570. 
 170. See Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27, at 37 (additional 
written responses of Sarah Oxenham Allen) (citing summary judgement deci-
sion in favor of the Virginia Board of Medicine, affirmed by the Fourth Circuit 
in Petrie v. Virginia Board of Medicine, 648 F. App’x 352 (4th Cir. 2016)). 
 171. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 172. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 103–
04 (1980). 
 173. See Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27, at 36 (additional 
written responses of Sarah Oxenham Allen) (“[A]t least two-thirds of the dozens 
of antitrust cases that have been brought against state licensing boards follow-
ing North Carolina Dental have also named as defendants board members in 
their official and individual capacities and requested damages from them.”). 
 174. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1115 (2015). 
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and because no monetary damages were sought in North Caro-
lina Dental.175 While antitrust suits brought by government 
agencies are unlikely to seek damages against individual board 
members, private plaintiffs suing state licensing boards are able 
and likely to seek treble damages against individual board mem-
bers.176  
The aftermath of North Carolina Dental has demonstrated 
that the Court’s dismissive treatment of individual board mem-
ber liability failed to take full account of the ways in which state 
indemnification regimes interact with treble damages sought 
under federal antitrust laws. Many states cap indemnification 
funding at a certain dollar amount, or refuse to indemnify de-
fendants against punitive damages.177 As noted above, the un-
certain application of Florida’s indemnification scheme to anti-
trust damages caused two board members to resign.178 
 Similarly, California’s indemnification statute for state gov-
ernment employees is uncertain to shield board members from 
individual liability. The Government Claims Act, like many 
state statutes, does not indemnify litigants against punitive 
damages.179 Whether treble damages constitute punitive dam-
ages for which board members may not seek indemnification is 
an open question. Although the California Attorney General has 
opined that treble damages do not constitute punitive damages 
within the meaning of the Government Claims Act, this repre-
sents yet another unresolved question that California and states 
with similar caps on indemnification must navigate in the post-
North Carolina Dental legal landscape.180  
 
 175. Id. at 1115–16. 
 176. Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1590 (citing Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 
421 U.S. 773, 791–92 (1975) (remanding case to allow private plaintiffs to seek 
treble damages against members of state bar association)); John E. Lopatka & 
William H. Page, State Action and the Meaning of the Agreement Under the 
Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 292 
(2003) (explaining that individual members of public/private hybrid offices are 
subject to “the whole panoply of antitrust remedies”). 
 177. State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-sovereign-immunity 
-and-tort-liability.aspx (last updated Oct. 14, 2010) (noting that thirty-three 
states statutorily limit the amount of damages that may be paid by the state); 
see also Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6, at 15–18 (questioning whether treble 
damages constitute punitive damages and thus whether the state must pay 
them); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 178. See supra notes 1–3, 12, and 16 and accompanying text. 
 179. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 818 (West 2018). 
 180. See Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6; supra note 6 and accompanying 
text. 
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Finally, even where board members do have a right to in-
demnification, there is no right to exculpation.181 The time taken 
by litigation, the stress attached to being named as a defendant, 
and the potential personal privacy cost of discovery are all strong 
disincentives to professionals serving on state licensing boards. 
These concerns are not theoretical; in a 2016 case brought 
against the Virginia Board of Medicine, each of the five board 
members named in the suit faced deposition and were required 
to produce private information regarding their professional prac-
tice and personal finances.182  
By any account, the Court’s decision in North Carolina Den-
tal gave rise to a flood of litigation against state boards and their 
individual members. This liability risk is exacerbated by treble 
damages and the uncertain application of indemnification 
schemes.183 The effects of North Carolina Dental have proved 
far-reaching and are unlikely to subside in the near future, ab-
sent legislative intervention.  
B. OVERVIEW OF POST-NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL LITIGATION 
AGAINST STATE LICENSING BOARDS 
Perhaps the best indication of the scope of risk that follows 
from North Carolina Dental can be gleaned from an overview of 
litigation that has occurred since the Supreme Court issued the 
decision in 2015.184 Since that time, suits have been filed in at 
 
 181. See Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27, at 7 (written 
statement of Sarah Oxenham Allen) (describing methods for achieving immun-
ity for board members). 
 182. Id. at 37 (additional written responses of Sarah Oxenham Allen). 
 183. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012); supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1579–82, for a broad synthesis of the 
antitrust litigation spawned by North Carolina Dental, describing suppression 
of innovative practices, unreasonable and unfair entry barriers, and scope-of-
practice challenges as the three major categories of litigation against state li-
censure boards. 
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least nine states including Arizona,185 California,186 Connecti-
cut,187 Georgia,188 Indiana,189 Louisiana,190 Missouri,191 Ne-
vada,192 North Carolina,193 Pennsylvania,194 Texas,195 and the 
District of Puerto Rico.196 State board antitrust challenges have 
been heard by the Third,197 Fourth,198 Fifth,199 Ninth,200 and 
Tenth Circuits.201 This list does not purport to be comprehensive, 
but is intended to give some indication of the scope of litigation 
 
 185. SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 
859 F.3d 720 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 499 (2017). 
 186. Gonzales v. Dep’t of Real Estate, No. 2:15-cv-2448 GEB GGH PS, 2017 
WL 2464515, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2017), report and recommendation adopted 
by No. 2:15-cv-2448 GEB GGH PS, 2017 WL 3953893 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017). 
 187. Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary Med., 157 F. Supp. 3d 130 (D. Conn. 
2016). 
 188. Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Judgment, & Injunctive Relief, 
Julien v. Ga. Bd. of Dentistry, No. 1:17-cv-04045-AT, 2017 WL 4583234, at *1 
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 12, 2017); Colindres v. Battle, No. 1:15-cv-02843-SCJ, 2016 WL 
4258930, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 6, 2016). 
 189. Prime Healthcare Servs.-Monroe, LLC. v. Ind. Univ. Health Blooming-
ton, No. 1:16-cv-00003-RLY-DKL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136474, at *1 (S.D. 
Ind. Sept. 30, 2016). 
 190. Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, 665 F. App’x 326, 326 (5th Cir. 2016), 
cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 2162 (2017) (denying nursing student’s antitrust claim 
against state board after the board terminated a university’s nursing program, 
and holding that the “district court was not required to determine whether the 
policy was actively supervised by the state in evaluating the board’s claim for 
sovereign immunity”). 
 191. Wallen v. St. Louis Metro. Taxicab Comm’n, No. 4:15-cv-1432 HEA, 
2016 WL 5846825, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 6, 2016). 
 192. Strategic Pharm. Sols., Inc. v. Nev. State Bd. of Pharmacy, No. 2:16-cv-
171-RFB-VCF, 2016 WL 3002370, at *1 (D. Nev. May 24, 2016) (dismissing ac-
tion without prejudice as a result of settlement requiring legislative action). 
 193. Jemsek v. N.C. Med. Bd., No. 5:16-CV-59-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23570, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 2017). 
 194. Bauer v. Pa. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam’rs, 188 F. Supp. 3d 510 (W.D. 
Pa. 2016). 
 195. Allibone v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. A-17-CA-00064-SS, 2017 WL 4768224, at 
*1 (W.D. Tex. Oct 20, 2017); Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 453 S.W.3d 606 (W.D. 
Tex. 2016). 
 196. Rivera-Nazario v. Corporacion del Fondo del Seguro del Estado, No. CV 
14-1533, 2015 WL 9484490, at *1 (D.P.R. Dec. 29, 2015). 
 197. See Edinboro Coll. Park Apartments v. Edinboro Univ. Found., 850 F.3d 
567 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 198. Petrie v. Va. Bd. of Med., 648 F. App’x 352 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 524 (2016). 
 199. Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, 665 F. App’x 326 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 200. SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 
859 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 201. Auraria Student Hous. v. Campus Vill. Apartments, 843 F.3d 1225 
(10th Cir. 2016). 
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that has followed in the wake of North Carolina Dental. How-
ever, commentators suggest that the litigation risk indicated by 
litigation to date may grossly understate the true liability facing 
boards across the country.202  
Despite the extensive litigation that has followed North Car-
olina Dental, common law is unlikely to provide an adequate so-
lution to state board antitrust liability. Litigation has failed to 
produce general principles at common law in part because the 
issues in these cases are too diverse to create coherent, broadly 
applicable common law doctrine.203 State licensing boards regu-
late a wide variety of professions, and perform a multitude of 
regulatory functions.204 As a result, the issues presented in the 
post-North Carolina Dental cases to date are too wide ranging to 
begin coalescing around tidy common law principles.205 
An additional reason for pursuing a legislative, rather than 
common law solution is that as litigants continue to test the con-
tours of North Carolina Dental in court, the litigation costs will 
continue to strain state legal defense funds.206 Defendants in lit-
igation following from North Carolina Dental are—of necessity—
state bodies, dependent on taxpayer support to defend them-
selves. Reliance upon common law to provide answers to the am-
biguities of North Carolina Dental therefore places a heavy fiscal 
burden on states, and diverts resources from other areas of pub-
lic concern.207 
 
 202. Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1580 (“[F]or every board that has been 
sued, there are more than one hundred others that are potentially vulnerable.”). 
 203. Compare Rodgers, 665 F. App’x at 326 (considering the antitrust liabil-
ity of a state medical board after the board terminated a nursing program from 
which petitioner had graduated), with Bauer v. Pa. State Bd. of Auctioneer 
Exam’rs, 188 F. Supp. 3d 510 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (considering the antitrust liability 
of the Pennsylvania State Board of Auctioneers for imposing citations and fines 
on an attorney who auctioned toy trains on the internet). 
 204. E.g., List of Iowa Boards and Commissions, IOWA.GOV, https://openup 
.iowa.gov/boardlist (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) (listing over 200 boards, commis-
sions, and councils, including professional boards managing podiatry, speech 
pathology, barbering, and message therapy). 
 205. Compare Allibone v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. A-17-CA-00064-SS, 2017 WL 
4768224 (W.D. Tex., Oct 20, 2017) (brought because of discriminatory practices 
favoring one form of medical practice over another), with Strategic Pharm. Sols., 
Inc. v. Nev. State Bd. of Pharmacy, No. 2:16-cv-171-RFB-VCF, 2016 WL 
3002370 (brought because the board was promoting a monopoly). 
 206. Cf. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and 
Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1174–75 (2016) (showing that in in-
stances of lawsuits brought against local law enforcement agencies, defending 
jurisdictions in some instances have to draw the funds from its general fund). 
 207. Id. 
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Finally, in many respects, the twisted path of the common 
law is what created this confused and confusing state of anti-
trust law in the first place. As noted above, judicial expansion of 
the Commerce Clause expanded the reach of the Sherman Act 
far beyond the intent of the enacting Congress.208 In response, 
the Court created state action immunity in order to shield states 
from antitrust lability.209 North Carolina Dental represents the 
latest iteration of the Court’s definition of state action immun-
ity—a strain of jurisprudence itself a testament to the ill-fitting 
application of antitrust law to public regulatory action.210 The 
result of this judge-made law culminating in North Carolina 
Dental essentially imposes a procedural requirement—states 
must review and affirmatively adopt the decisions of state 
boards in order to shield the decisions from antitrust liability—
but should the state fail to faithfully exercise this mandated pro-
cess, the board and its individual members bear antitrust liabil-
ity and potential treble damages.211 If this is where the common 
law has led us, it is perhaps time for a clear and well-considered 
statutory scheme to lead us out.  
C. FAILURES OF THE RESTORING BOARD IMMUNITY ACT OF 2017 
For the reasons outlined below, federal and state responses 
to North Carolina Dental proposed to date are insufficient. The 
RBI Act is both inadequate and overbroad in its approach. While 
there are instances of states facilitating careful administrative 
review according to procedures likely to satisfy Midcal’s second 
prong,212 there is no guarantee that state legislation will satisfy 
the Court’s ill-defined active supervision requirement. A solution 
to federal antitrust liability dependent on state statutes is less 
certain than a federal solution, and may still lead to excess and 
expensive litigation as a result. 
The RBI Act paints with too broad a brush, failing to differ-
entiate between the many occupations regulated by boards, and 
 
 208. See supra Part I.C.1.; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
(expanding the reach of the Commerce Clause). 
 209. See supra notes 71, 76–77, 89, 94–99 and accompanying text. 
 210. The Supreme Court acknowledged this ill fit in Parker, holding that the 
Sherman Act is intended to guard against individual private action, but not 
state action. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943). 
 211. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (providing for treble damages). 
 212. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980) (stating the second prong is that the state must actively supervise the 
actor charged with executing the policy). 
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fails to hit its target, offering the carrot of immunity without ad-
dressing the Court’s underlying concerns regarding boards’ an-
ticompetitive actions.213 The RBI Act applies only to licensure, 
and fails to address a myriad other board functions which may 
have anticompetitive effects that should be weighed and bal-
anced. In this sense, the RBI Act simultaneously does too 
much—imposing a federal regulatory agenda over the top of ex-
isting state statutes and regulations—and not enough, by failing 
to address nuances of the very different industries that licensing 
boards regulate. 
1. The Restoring Board Immunity Act Addresses Only 
Licensing Activity 
As discussed above, occupational licensing boards possess 
regulatory responsibilities for occupations within each state that 
expand far beyond the act of licensing.214 Under the facts of 
North Carolina Dental, licensure was not explicitly at issue.215 
Rather, the Board made a determination that the practice of den-
tistry included teeth whitening and issued cease and desist let-
ters to non-dentists offering this service.216 While the RBI Act 
may encapsulate this situation by mandating that licensing laws 
be narrowly enforced against occupations “that are included ex-
plicitly in the statute or regulation that defines the occupation’s 
scope of practice,”217 the bulk of the bill is aimed at acts of licens-
ing and reducing licensure requirements.218 Other board actions, 
such as regulating advertisements, disciplinary proceedings, 
and other common duties of boards, receive neither legislative 
guidance nor immunity under the RBI Act. This gap leaves 
states with a great deal of antitrust liability.  
Neither can the RBI Act claim to shield states from all li-
censing-related liability. Indeed, much of the litigation outlined 
above may not be prevented by the immunity offered to states 
under the RBI Act. Take for example the Texas telemedicine pro-
vider who sued the State Board of Medicine in 2015, shortly after 
North Carolina Dental was issued. The telemedicine provider 
 
 213. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra Part I.A. 
 215. N.C. Dental State Bd. of Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2015). 
 216. Id. 
 217. H.R. 3446, 115th Cong. § 5(b)(3) (2017). 
 218. Immunity under the bill “shall not apply to an action unrelated to reg-
ulating the personal qualifications required to engage in or practice a lawful 
occupation.” Id. § 4(d). 
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disputed the validity of the Board’s rule that a doctor-patient re-
lationship can only be established via an in-person meeting.219 
This rule effectively keeps telemedicine providers out of the mar-
ket—a restriction of trade that implicates antitrust concerns. 
However, the RBI Act only addresses licensure, not Board regu-
lations that function to constrain competition. It is unclear that 
the RBI Act, even if enacted and adopted by the State of Texas, 
would provide the Board of Medicine with any legal cover what-
soever in challenges of this variety.220 
2. The Restoring Board Immunity Act Likely Carries High 
Implementation Costs and Arbitrary Alternations to State 
Statutes 
States like Colorado, discussed above, already have a super-
visory agency overseeing the work and decisions of occupational 
boards.221 DORA has successfully kept licensure requirements 
relatively low across the State,222 balancing the importance of an 
unrestricted economy with health and safety considerations for 
Colorado residents. Overhauling this system, or even adapting 
it to conform to the RBI Act’s conception of an Office of Supervi-
sion of Occupational Boards,223 places form over function, and 
creates redundancy between state and federal government.  
Colorado is not alone in having an existing infrastructure 
that would require substantial renovation in order to comply 
with the RBI Act.224 This is due in part to the particularities of 
the Act—for example, the stipulation that occupational licensing 
 
 219. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 111–13, Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., 
No. 1:15-cv-00343-RP (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2015), 2015 WL 4387362; see also 2015 
Tex. Reg. 485 (Feb. 6, 2015) (specifying that communications via email, text, 
chat, or phone are inadequate to establish a doctor-patient relationship—a pre-
requisite to issuing prescriptions). 
 220. See H.R. 3446 § 4(d) (“[I]mmunity . . . shall not apply to an action unre-
lated to regulating the personal qualifications required to engage in or practice 
a lawful occupation, such as rules of an occupational licensing board governing 
minimum prices or residency requirements.”). 
 221. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-102 (2016). 
 222. See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., supra note 47, 
at 26 (showing that the average required education or experience for licensure 
in Colorado is similar or lower than the majority of states). 
 223. See H.R. 3446 § 5(c). 
 224. See supra notes 127–31, 139 and accompanying text (discussing the li-
censing infrastructure of Connecticut, Georgia, and California, respectively). 
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boards cannot receive immunity under the Act unless a mini-
mum of two-thirds of the members are appointed by an elected 
member of the state.225  
In addition, much of what state licensing boards do is min-
isterial and administrative in nature. Requiring boards to sub-
mit even non-discretionary decisions to an Office of Supervision 
of Occupational Boards creates unnecessary review carrying a 
greater public cost of funding the Office. This also delays licens-
ing decisions, which negatively impacts even successful appli-
cants.226  
Similarly, when a licensing board files suit against an indi-
vidual to enjoin an unlicensed person from practicing a regulated 
profession, submitting the decision to an Office of Supervision is 
a redundant procedural step. Filing a lawsuit rarely carries an-
titrust liability.227 When a lawsuit is initiated, the court, a sov-
ereign state body,228 makes the ultimate decision regarding any 
anticompetitive action, and not the non-sovereign board.229 
Seeking the approval of a sovereign state actor (the Office of Su-
pervision) in order to submit the decision to a second sovereign 
state actor (the state court) is cumbersome, unnecessary, and 
likely to create “bureaucratic ossification” without producing 
meaningful review of self-interested boards.230  
Variation in regulatory practices among states is arguably a 
positive element of occupational regulation. States have freedom 
to experiment, to seek innovation, or to adopt a policy of stricter 
consumer protection—policy preferences that can peak and ebb 
with the politically elected officials of a state.231 States with 
 
 225. Id. § 3(8)(c). 
 226. Contra COLO. DEP’T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, supra note 133, at 3 
(documenting the Department’s progress toward its goal of reducing licensing 
processing time by one-third). 
 227. See FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 34, at 6 (explaining that filing a 
lawsuit is only susceptible to an antitrust challenge if it falls within the “sham 
exception”); WICKELGREN, supra note 39, at 20–21 (explaining that filing suit 
rarely triggers antitrust exposure because the ultimate decision about the de-
fendant’s fitness to participate in the market is rendered by the court, a true 
state actor, insulating the board from antitrust liability). 
 228. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 575–80 (1984) (holding that deci-
sions of a state supreme court are sovereign state actions not subject to scrutiny 
under the Sherman Act). 
 229. Id. at 574 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1970)). 
 230. Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1602. 
 231. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1494 (1987) (advocating for federalism, as it provides 
for “unit[s] of decision making” that are at once large enough to adequately 
measure the costs and benefits, while small enough that there is minimal risk 
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space to experiment with regulatory practices are more nimble 
than a centrally controlled federal system, and are able to piece 
together regulatory systems best suited to a particular state.232  
3. The Restoring Board Immunity Act May Disincentivize 
Board Consideration of Competitive Impacts of Official Action 
by Granting Blanket Immunity 
Vigorous competition promotes consumer interests by driv-
ing down prices, increasing quality, and promoting the availabil-
ity of goods and services.233 Incentivizing states and state regu-
latory boards to remain watchful of the competitive 
consequences of their actions is therefore desirable. Granting 
blanket immunity to boards may create an environment in which 
supervisory and review functions are mechanically carried out 
without reviewing the substance of the decision or the true re-
strictive impacts of the decision. Creating a system in which reg-
ulatory boards have guidance in crafting and executing an effec-
tive supervisory program, with the continued threat of antitrust 
liability if the program is not faithfully executed, is likely a 
greater service to consumers than an iron clad grant of immun-
ity.  
D. FAILURES OF STATE LEGISLATION 
The obvious downside of turning to states to solve the liabil-
ity problems posed by North Carolina Dental is that the validity 
of state statutes is unpredictable. While the U.S. Congress may 
enact legislation that effectively amends the Sherman Act by 
creating a carve-out for state regulatory boards following certain 
requirements, state legislators do not have the ability to amend 
federal law. States may statutorily implement supervisory pro-
cedures that seem likely to satisfy the Court’s active supervision 
requirement. However, states are working to create a defense to 
the Sherman Act—a federal cause of action.234 A state-level stat-
utory immunity defense to a federal cause of action creates a 
 
to the central government). 
 232. Id. at 1608 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a la-
boratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country.”)); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Feder-
alism, 26 LAW J. & ECON. 23, 34–35 (1983) (describing the value of competition 
among diverse jurisdictions). 
 233. FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 34, at 2. 
 234. See, e.g., Robert Eisig Bienstock, Municipal Antitrust Liability: Beyond 
  
460 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:425 
 
mismatch. States cannot rewrite or supersede federal law, and 
where state regulatory processes violate federal antitrust law, 
federal law controls.235 
Even if states pass statutes authorizing supervisory agen-
cies and they comply with the Court’s active supervision require-
ment, the uncertainty of whether the supervisory provisions are 
sufficient still invites litigation. In this way, passing state legis-
lation does not keep states from being dragged into court on 
North Carolina Dental grounds. Even the most carefully crafted 
state statute, while it may remove liability, may still be chal-
lenged. The inefficiency of all fifty states independently crafting 
and enacting legislation, then defending in court the capacity of 
the supervisory structures to provide sufficient state supervi-
sion, cannot be the best option. Instead, a more cooperative 
model is needed—one that strikes a balance between the over-
reaching blanket policies of the proposed federal legislation, and 
the state solutions that have been proposed to date.  
III.  COOPERATIVE LEGISLATION: OUTLINING 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE MODEL 
STATUTE   
Working from the conclusion that federal and state legisla-
tive responses to North Carolina Dental to date have been either 
inappropriate or insufficient to address the litigation risk facing 
state licensing boards, the following Section outlines elements of 
a possible solution. This recommendation does not pretend to be 
comprehensive, but is intended merely as a starting point for 
structuring a federal/state collaboration to achieve the best re-
sults for consumers and states. Factors relevant to the recom-
mendations that follow include: providing for consumer health 
and safety; promoting economic competition; cost of implemen-
tation; reducing duplicative legislation; and bringing predicta-
bility to states’ antitrust liability.  
 
Immunity, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1829, 1867 n.200 (describing one method of com-
bating claims of antitrust at the municipal level is to argue for deference to the 
action because it serves the greater good). 
 235. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires this result. U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. State laws that conflict with federal law are “without ef-
fect.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). Because the Sherman 
Act states that “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce” is illegal, state laws holding the Sherman Act inapplicable 
in certain circumstances may be challenged on preemption grounds. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (2012).  
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Unlike state statutes, federal legislation has the distinct ad-
vantage of possessing the authority to amend current federal 
law. Federal lawmakers have clear authority to draft federal an-
titrust legislation, even if the result essentially amends the 
Sherman Act, or supplants Supreme Court precedent interpret-
ing the Sherman Act.236 The obvious drawback of legislating at 
the federal level is the difficulty of creating a federal framework 
sufficiently nuanced to address the regulatory and licensing 
function of occupational boards across the United States. To 
combine the authority of federal legislation and the nimbler na-
ture of state legislation, this Part recommends cooperative legis-
lation between states and the federal government. In this way, 
Congress can lend its federal authority to states, while also em-
powering states to utilize existing state statutory structures to 
address gaps in board oversight.  
The federal component of this recommendation has two 
prongs. First, this Part envisions stand-alone federal legislation 
with no required action by states. Second, the legislation would 
create exemptions from antitrust liability for state boards com-
pliant with certain federal objectives.  
A. STAND-ALONE FEDERAL LEGISLATION: A REMEDY FOR 
INDIVIDUAL BOARD MEMBER LIABILITY 
A key weakness of the RBI Act is its blanket treatment of 
discrete issues. However, there are two issues that arose in the 
wake of North Carolina Dental that are appropriate for sweeping 
federal legislation. The first is board members’ personal liability; 
the second is the composition of supervisory bodies responsible 
for active supervision.  
First, federal legislation may be employed to provide blan-
ket exculpation of individual board members. As discussed 
above, many state indemnification statutes do not provide reim-
bursement for punitive damages.237 Others cap indemnification 
beyond a specified dollar amount.238 Treble damages in antitrust 
suits create a particular problem in this respect. A new federal 
bill would follow the model of 15 U.S.C. § 35, which provides that 
damages recovered under the Clayton Act cannot be recovered 
 
 236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3 (granting Congress power to regulate com-
merce between states). 
 237. See supra notes 12–13, 177 and accompanying text. 
 238. See Op. Cal. Att’y Gen., supra note 6, at 15–18; see also supra note 177 
and accompanying text. 
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from local governments.239 Similarly, a new federal bill should 
provide that antitrust damages awarded against state licensing 
boards cannot be recovered against individual board members in 
their personal capacities.  
Although this type of exculpation provision might appear to 
incentivize individual board members to engage in anticompeti-
tive behavior without fear of repercussion, such fears may be al-
layed by institutional controls over licensing boards. Irrespective 
of individual board members’ liability, antitrust lawsuits will re-
main costly for states defending their boards, because the state 
itself may still be held liable. This cost strongly incentivizes 
states to carefully train board members to assess the anticom-
petitive effects of board decisions. States are also incentivized to 
identify and dismiss individual bad actors serving on state 
boards. Further, the continued litigation risk for states encour-
ages careful scrutiny of board decisions by state supervisory bod-
ies, as required by Midcal and affirmed by North Carolina Den-
tal.240 
 Further, as North Carolina Dental makes clear, antitrust 
immunity is premised on the adequacy of the state’s supervision 
over the board.241 It is a non sequitur to suggest that boards 
should not be engaging in anticompetitive conduct in the first 
place so as not to require immunity under Parker—the core func-
tion of licensing boards is to make regulatory decisions that re-
strict some providers from entering the market.242 To say that 
licensing boards should not engage in anticompetitive conduct is 
to say that licensing boards should not give effect to their statu-
torily mandated purpose.243 Antitrust liability, in the context of 
licensing boards, hinges not on anticompetitive behavior, but on 
 
 239. E.g., Hearing on Occupational Licensing, supra note 27, at 10 (testi-
mony of Sarah Oxenham Allen) (presenting the notion that a statute similar to 
15 U.S.C. § 35 could work for indemnifying board members against antitrust 
challenges). 
 240. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1105 (2015); 
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 97–98 
(1980). 
 241. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1105. 
 242. Justice Scalia probed this issue at Oral Argument, asking “[w]hat . . . is 
a more obvious restriction of competition than preventing somebody from com-
peting? . . . It seems to me [licensing and standard setting] . . . both involve an-
ticompetitive decisions.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, N.C. Dental, 135 S. 
Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534). 
 243. See supra Part I.A. (explaining that boards are statutorily charged with 
regulating markets for the purpose of safeguarding consumer health and 
safety). 
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the adequacy of state supervision. Ensuring that individual 
board members are indemnified from personal liability does not 
distort individual incentives, but right-sizes liability by ensuring 
that only actors with the ability to reasonably avoid antitrust 
liability bear any litigation risk.  
Moving next to the question of what form of state body is 
required to perform supervisory functions, federal law may also 
provide a clean, certain solution. As discussed above, the Su-
preme Court’s guidance on this question leaves states with a 
great deal of ambiguity.244 State legislatures and state supreme 
courts act with sufficient “Stateness” to trigger state action im-
munity.245 Cities and municipalities, by contrast, do not act with 
sufficient “Stateness,” and may only displace competition when 
acting in accordance with a clearly articulated state policy, 
though active supervision is not required.246 The Supreme Court 
has never specifically addressed whether traditional state agen-
cies act with sufficient “Stateness”—all that has been said is that 
state agencies dominated by active market participants are not 
sufficiently sovereign.247  
To resolve this ambiguity and head off further litigation on 
this issue without upsetting the common law scheme, Congress 
should acknowledge that traditional state agencies are suffi-
ciently sovereign to supervise licensing boards and to adopt de-
cisions of boards on behalf of the state. As discussed above, fail-
ure to recognize the capacity of traditional state agencies to 
perform this function would lead to impractical results.248 Con-
gress may define traditional state agencies using various char-
acteristics, but in order to preserve the current state of common 
law, Congress may dictate that a traditional state agency is one 
comprised entirely, or almost entirely, of full-time employees of 
the state.  
B. FEDERAL ENDORSEMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION  
There are two major hurdles facing states attempting to 
comply with North Carolina Dental. First, states must deter-
mine what sort of government body acts with sufficient 
“Stateness” to trigger state action immunity. Second, states 
must determine what processes and procedures satisfy the active 
 
 244. See Allensworth, supra note 68. 
 245. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 246. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985). 
 247. N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1106. 
 248. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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supervision requirement. The federal government imposes these 
requirements through the Sherman Act, and the federal govern-
ment has the power to clarify what is necessary for their fulfill-
ment.249 While blanket federal legislation may be effectively ap-
plied to address the composition of the supervising body, as 
discussed above, a more flexible approach is required to define 
the procedures constituting adequate supervision.  
Rather than the prescriptive requirements of the RBI Act, 
this Section recommends a flexible federal statute that endorses 
state legislation. While this type of cooperative legislation is per-
haps nontraditional, it is not without precedent. In the insurance 
context, for example, the federal government has introduced a 
host of legislative tools to assist states in developing their own 
standards, rather than imposing federal standards.250  
One possible model is the 1990 Medicare supplement legis-
lation, in which Congress permitted states to develop standards 
for Medicare supplement policies.251 State standard drafting was 
guided by regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHS).252 This type of federal/state 
partnership could be effectively duplicated in the context of oc-
cupational licensing, with states following the direction of FTC 
guidance documents. Helpfully, the FTC has already promul-
gated extensive guidance to states seeking to comply with North 
Carolina Dental’s active supervision requirement.253 The FTC 
could expand upon and formalize this guidance, mirroring DHS’s 
guidance of state policy design.  
Borrowing statutory models from the insurance context can 
also help to overcome the efficiency problems inherent in fifty 
separate states working independently to define a supervisory 
system that will stand up to Midcal’s active supervision require-
ment. Under a recent legislative proposal, the Federal Insurance 
Office would evaluate state regulatory standards, identify best 
 
 249. Admittedly, it is the Supreme Court that technically imposes these re-
quirements through the development of the state action immunity doctrine. 
However, this doctrine is a safe harbor from the reach of the Sherman Act—a 
federal statute adopted by the legislature. 
 250. FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE 
AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
8 (2013). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. FTC STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 34. 
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practices based on a consensus of the states, then use the col-
lected data to promulgate national targets.254 This model could 
be effectively applied in the context of occupational licensing, 
again with the FTC playing a central role. The FTC’s Bureau of 
Protection could take stock of the supervisory structures and 
procedures employed by states, and promulgate best practices 
based on the results. While such targets are nonbinding, this ex-
ercise would help to create greater uniformity in licensing review 
procedures between states, and would provide guidance to states 
seeking to substantially restructure their licensing laws to con-
form with the current legal landscape.255 
Another potential model for federal/state cooperative legis-
lation is the State Modernization and Regulatory Transparency 
Act (SMART Act), introduced in 2004.256 The SMART Act as pro-
posed would have allowed states to develop their own insurance 
reform standards, and exempted states from federal require-
ments as long as the state’s scheme satisfied certain federal ob-
jectives.257 Where federal objectives were not satisfied by the 
state’s standards, this exemption would not apply, leading state 
law to be preempted by federal law.258 This same model could be 
effectively applied to state licensing boards. Rather than the RBI 
Act, Congress could pass a federal statute prescribing manda-
tory supervision requirements, which applies only when states’ 
supervisory structures fail to meet certain requirements. This 
would preserve the existing structure of state law, while also re-
storing antitrust immunity to state licensing boards. 
 By utilizing existing or previously proposed models of coop-
erative legislation between federal and state governments, the 
challenges posed by North Carolina Dental may be addressed in 
a way that is non-duplicative, streamlined, and substantially re-
duces the uncertainty currently being worked out through litiga-
tion, rather than legislation. 
 
 254. See id. (discussing this system as a “national passport approach”); see 
also FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 250, at 9. 
 255. See Allensworth, supra note 7, at 1608 (discussing the potential benefits 
to be derived from states looking to the review procedures of other states to 
create a statutory scheme capable of fulfilling Midcal’s active supervision re-
quirement). 
 256. See FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 250. 
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 258. Id. 
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  CONCLUSION   
North Carolina Dental created substantial liability for state 
occupational licensing boards across the country. Because licens-
ing boards are granted authority to regulate occupations, and 
because the exercise of that authority very often entails anticom-
petitive results, North Carolina Dental is in many ways a liabil-
ity trap for states. Recognizing this, state and federal lawmakers 
have sought ways to address the liability born by states and in-
dividual board members under North Carolina Dental. Legisla-
tive responses to date are insufficient to address the litigation 
chasm opened by the Supreme Court.  
This Note has attempted to sketch a possible solution 
through a federal/state legislative partnership, lending the au-
thority of federal legislation to state lawmakers and seeking to 
leverage preexisting state statutes to create an efficient answer 
to occupational board antitrust liability. Developing a coopera-
tive framework between federal and state lawmakers may pro-
vide a solution that reduces litigation, improves board aware-
ness of the competitive impacts of their decisions, and does not 
necessitate a complete overhaul of existing state law. The solu-
tion proposed here seeks to create a flexible statutory framework 
aimed at addressing the uncertainty that has followed in the 
wake of North Carolina Dental, without allowing federal legisla-
tion with ulterior motivations to substantially overhaul state 
law. 
 
